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Lyon surveys  the effects  of taxation  and asymmetric  related  role. In addition  to increasing  the collateral  of
information  on the financing  of investment.  In the  an entrepreneur,  the ability  to earn high rates of return
absence  of these  two factors,  traditional  economic  increases  the opportunity  cost  of undertaking  projects
models  predict  that funds for investment  flow to  with  low  expected  returns.
projects  with the highest  expected  return.  The form of  *  Creating  decentralized  securities  markets  is
the investment  (for example,  whether  by equity,  bank  likely  to be less  advantageous  where  information
loan, or another  form of debt finance)  is irrelevant.  asymmetries  are great.  Individual  providers  of funds
In the presence  of either  taxation  or information  have  an incentive  to free-ride  on the information  and
asymmetries,  however,  neither  of these  predictions  monitoring  of entrepreneurs  provided  by others.  Only
necessarily  holds.  Financing  may not go toward  those  firms  with established  reputations  may be able to
projects  with the highest  expected  return and the form  obtain  funds  in these  markets.
in which  the financing  is conveyed  can affect the  * Similarly,  while  competition  among  lenders  is
profitability  of the project  to both  the provider  of  generally  promoted,  such competition  can also reduce
funds  and the recipient.  the incentive  for individual  lenders  to lend to entre-
What  are the policy implications  of the effects  of  preneurs  where  infornation and monitoring  costs  are
these factors  on the financing  of investment?  large.  Competitors  would  attempt  to "steal" these
- Depending  on technological  characteristics,  borrowers  away after they were certified  as creditwor-
informational  asymmetries  can result in either  thy. Further,  limited  competition  allows  a lender  to
overinvestment  or underinvestment  in an economy.  use the sanction  of denying  credit as an instrument  to
Clearly,  depending  on which  outcome  occurs,  policy  influence  borrowers  to act responsibly  in order to
recommendations  to correct  the inefficiency  differ.  obtain  future financing.
While  persistent  overinvestment  is unlikely  to  - As the result of information  asymmeties, certain
characterize  most developing  economies,  there  are  types of projects  are more  likely to obtain  financing  at
certainly  many occasions  when  funds are applied  to  a lower  cost using  equity  finance  rath,"r  than  debt. If
projects  with  low expected  returns.  the tax costs  of equity  are higher thani  those of debt,
e  Increases  in the level of wealth  and collateral  in  however,  these  projects  may be relatively
an economy  can greatly  reduce  the costs  of asymmet-  underfinanced.  Tax policy  might  wish to consider
ric information.  Increases  in collateral  reduce  the  whether  the tax treatment  of equity  and debt should
risks faced  by lenders.  Entrepreneurs  with poor  be equalized  or whether  tax costs of these  projects  can
projects  are less likely  to undertake  them when  they  be reduced  in other  ways.
must risk  more  of their own wealth.  Government  *  Government  may feel  an obligation  to intervene
policies that  increase  the ability of individuals  to  directly  in credit  allocation,  but should  do so only
collateralize  wealth  - for example,  by promoting  where  it has a greater  ability  to identify  creditworthy
property  rights  and the establishment  of a legal  recipients  than other  lenders  do. In the absence  of any
system  that  allows  the low-cost  transfer  of collateral  comparative  advantage,  government  attention  to the
- can increase  the ability of potentially  successful  basic  infrastructure  that  reduces  the costs of obtaining
projects  to receive financing.  Policies  that  facilitate  information  and enforcing  contracts  is likely to better
the ability of individuals  to accumulate  savings  play a  assist  the efficient  allocation  of credit.
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This is one of a series  of papers  commissioned  by the Tax Incentives  Evaluation  Research  Project
of the Public  Economics  Division  of The World  Bank. The project  is directed  by Anwar  Shah.
I wish to thank Karla Hoff for many  useful  suggestions  and especially  Anwar  Shah for his
guidance  of this project.This paper presents a survey of the effects of taxation  and asymmetric  information  on the
financing  of investment. In the absence of these two factors, traditional economic  models predict that
funds for investment  flow to projects with the highest expected  return.  The particular form in which
the investment  occurs (for example, whether  by equity, bank loan, or other form of debt finance) is
irrelevant. In the presence of either taxation  or information  asymmetries,  however, neither of these
predictions necessarily  holds.  Financing  may not go toward those projects with the highest expected
return and the form in which the financing is conveyed  can affect the profitability  of the project to
both the provider of funds and the recipient.
Under a classical  corporate income tax, dividends,  retained earnings, and debt are all treated
differently. Firms are expected  to adopt the form of finance with the lowest tax costs.  If all firms do
not have equal access to the lowest cost source of funds, however, investment  may fail to go toward
those projects with the highest returns.  Firms may find that certain  projects that would have been
profitable  to undertake using one source of funds are unprofitable  using other sources of funds due to
the higher tax costs.  These tax costs become barriers to the efficient allocation  of capital across
firms.
Asymmetric information  presents a different type of barrier to the efficient allocation  of
capital. Ultimately the provider of funds for an investment  project can never know as much about  the
project as the entrepreneur  undertaking the activity. The entrepreneur  has some scope to change  the
riskiness of a project's returns in unobservable  ways and has the ability to pursue other activities
which benefit only himself (e.g., leisure).  Since  the entrepreneur's actions are not fiully  observable
(or could only be observed at high cost), contracts cannot  be enforced  which dictate under all possible
contingencies  how the entrepreneur  is to perform. Instead, as in other principal-agent  problems, the
provider of funds must find indirect means to influence  the behavior of the entrepreneur. The methodof financing is an important  instrument  in guiding the behavior  of the entrepreneur  under asymmetric
information.
The effects of these factors on the financing  of investment  have numerous  policy implications:
Depending  on technological  characteristics,  informational  asymmetries  can result in
either over-investinent  or under-investment  in an economy. Clearly, depending  on
which outcome occurs, policy recommendations  to correct the inefficiency  differ.
While persistent over-investment  is unlikely to characterize most developing
economies,  there are certainly  many occasions  when funds are applied to projects with
low expected  retums.  The possibility  that an increased availability  of funds will result
in misdirected  investment  cannot be ignored.
Increases in the level of wealth and collateral  in an economy  can greatly reduce the
costs of asymmetric  information. Increases in collateral  reduce the risks faced by
lenders. Entrepreneurs with poor projects are less likely to undertake them when they
must risk more of their own wealth. Government  policies which increase  the ability
of individuals  to collateralize  wealth, for example  by promoting property rights and
the establishment  of a legal system that allows the transfer of collateral at low cost,
can increase the ability for potentially  successful  projects to receive financing.
Policies which facilitate  the ability  of individuals  to accumulate  savings play a related
role.  In addition to increasing the collateral  of an entrepreneur,  the ability  to earn
high rates of return increases  the opportunity  cost of undertaking  projects with low
expected  returns.
The creation of decentralized  securities markets is likely to be less advantageous
where information  asymmetries  re large.  Individual  providers of funds have an
incentive  to free-ride on the information  and monitoring of entrepreneurs  provided  byothers.  Only firms established  reputations  may be able to obtain funds in these
markets.
Similarly, while competition  among  lenders is generally promoted, such competition
can also reduce the incentive  for individual  lenders to loan to entrepreneurs  where
information  and monitoring costs are large.  Competitors  would attempt to 'steal'
these borrowers away after they were certified as creditworthy. Further, limited
competition  allows a lender to .ase  the sanction  of denying credit as an instrument  to
influence  borrowers  to act responsibly  in order to obtain future financing.
As the result of information  asymmetries,  certain types of projects are more likely to
obtain financing  at a lower cost using equity finance rather than debt.  If the tax costs
of equity are higher than those of debt, however, these projects may be relatively
underfinanced. Tax policy might wish to reconsider whether the tax treatment  of
equity and debt should be equalized  or whether tax costs of these projects can be
reduced in other ways.
While government may feel an obligation  to intervene  directly in credit allocation, any
such intervention  should only occur where government  has a greater ability to identify
creditworthy  recipients  than other lenders. In the absence  of any comparative
advantage,  government  attention  to the basic infrastructure  which reduces the costs of
obtaining information  and enforcing contracts is likely to better assist the efficient
allocation of credit.I.  Intwd(uction
This paper is intended as a survey of the effects of taxation and asymmetric information  on the
financing  choice of the firm.  The literature on taxation  posits a straightforward  relationship  between  the
pretax cost of funds and the required return on an investment  project to cover the cost of finance which
is a function  only of tax rates. The real decisions  of the firm are assumed  in these analyses  to be affected
only by the after-tax cost of funds.
An alternative literature has focused on how the choice of financing can influence the real
decisions  of the firm. At least since  Adam Smith,  economists  have recognized  how managerial  incentives
may differ with outside ownership  of the firm.  1 Two problems face outside debt and equity investors.
First, there is an inability  to monitor completely  the activities of the firm's managers. Second, outside
investors are less informed  than the firm's managers  as to the profitability  of alternative  actions. These
monitoring and  information problems affect the  financing of  enterprises ranging in  scale from
multinationals  to single entrepreneurs.  When ihere are outside equity holders, management  may have
a reduced incentive  to take actions  that maximize  firm value. This occurs because  management  bears the
full cost of increasing its managerial effort, yet receives only a portion of the benefit from this effort.
With debt finance, management  may pursue excessively  risky projects.  Management  captures the full
marginal  return to additional  profit of successful  projects but may bear no marginal  loss in unsuccessful
projects. Projects with extreme variance  in outcomes  may then be favored.
Outside investors are aware  that management  has the incentive  to undertake  activities  that fail to
maximize investors' wealth.  Investors  will factor these deviations into the price they will be willing to
pay for the firm's  equity or the terms under which they will lend money to the firm.  As a result,
Ilensen and Meckling  (1976) cite a particularly relevant  passage from Adam Smith's  he Wealth gof
Nain  (1776):  "The directors of such Ooint-stock]  companies, being the managers rather of other
people's money  than of their own, it cannot  well be expected  that they should watch  over it with the same
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery watch over their own."
-1-expected  deviations from firm value maximization  are at least partly borne by the management.
It would be in the interest of management  to contract with the outside investors to operate the
firm in the same manner as they would without outside  ovxnership. However, unless outside investors
have complete  information  on all of the activities of the managers, this contract is not enforceable. In
the absence of  the ability to  convey symmetric information to  potential investors, managers bear
additional  costs when outside finance is obtained.
The divergence  in the cost of internal and external  sources of finance may affect the efficiency
with which investment  is allocated.  Firms with access to sufficient internal funds or external funds
without  significant  agency costs may be able to undertake all investment  opportunities  with positive net
present value.  Other firms, however, may face a divergence  between the required return on internal
funds and that required on external funds due to  asymmetric information.  In this case, investment
opportunities  which would  be profitable  to undertake  with internal  funds may not yield sufficient  returns
to allow  external financing. Investment  is misallocated  because  projects with high marginal  returns may
not receive financing, while projects available to firms with lower marginal returns are undertaken.
Further, the wrong amount  of investment  may be undertaken.
The next section  of this paper examines  how differential  taxation  of retained earnings, new share
issues, and debt finance  affects the financing  choice of the firm in the absence  of asymmetric  information.
Section III examines the problems of asymmetric informiation  that arise with external finance.  Section
IV briefly examines  mechanisms  that have  been created  in rural sectors of developing  countries  to counter
the problems of asymmetric  information.  The final section of the paper examines  policy options open
to government  to reduce the costs  of the inefficiencies  created  by asymmetric  information. Unfortunately,
policy prescriptions  appear to be very de-pendent  on the form of the information  asymmetry.  General
govermnent solutions tc the problem of asymmetric  information  may not be possible without a precise
understanding  of the nature of the information  problem.
-2-H.  Debt. Eauitv.  and Taxes Under-Svmmetric Information
A corporation  can finance its initial  investment  by issuing  either equity  or debt. Equity represents
ownership in the corporation. An equity investor  receives a proportionate  share of an uncertain future
stream of income from the corporation. Assuming  limited liability, the equity owner's potential loss is
limited to the amount mnvested  in the corporation. Debt represents a promise of a fixed payment to the
lender.  If the corporation defaults on this promise, the firm may be liquidated.  The proceeds of the
liquidation  are paid to the firm-'s  lenders up to the amount of the promised  payment.  If the liquidation
payment is less than the promised payment, the 'enders bear the loss.
These two different financing options have quite different return characteristics. Even in the
absew,e  of the confounding  effects of taxation,  one might expect  that there is an optimal  ratio of debt and
equity for a firm  - that is, some optimal  mixture of debt and equity which maximizes  the value of the
firm.  A surprising  result of the Modigliani-Miller  (1958)  theorem, however, is that the value of the firm
is independent  of the choice of financing. This fundamental  theorem of corporate finance was derived
in the absence  of tax effects and assumes  that the real activity of the firm is independent  of its financing
choice.
In the presence of taxes this result may no longer be true, as shown in a subsequent  paper by
Modigliani  and Miller (1963). The analysis  of this section will first examine  the initial financing  choice
of a firm in the presence of taxes. This analysis is developed  along the lines of Modigliani and Miller
(1958, 1963) and Miller (1977).  Next, the role of retained earnings, a source of finance not available
for the initial investment  of the start-up firm, will be considered. This analysis  is intended  to show how
a firm would choose its mix of financing under the original assumptions of Modigliani and Miller where
the real activity of the firm is not affected by the financing mix and there is no risk of bankruptcy.
Section  III drops  these assumptions  and incorporates  the effects  of bankruptcy  and asymmetric  information
on the value of the firm.
-3-A.  Modidlani-Miller  eorem
Under a classical  or unintegrated  system of corporate  taxation, debt and equity iracdme  are treated
differently. In such a tax system, a corporation may deduct payments  of interest from taxable income,
but not payments  of dividends. Interest income is taxable  to the bondholder. A unit of pretax earnings
of the corporation  paid as interest yields  net income  of (I - rb), where Tb is the bondholder's tax rate on
interest income.  Dividend income, in addition to being taxed at the corporate leve!  is taxab'e to the
stockholder. Dividend income is thus subject to a "double  tax" in an unintegrated  tax system. 2 One
unit of pretax income to be distributed as a dividend  is first reduced  by corporate tax payments  Tc,  and
the remainder is then taxed at the stockholder  tax rate Td. The net income to the dividend recipient is
(1 - rc)(1 - 'd) per unit of pretax earnings.
Corporate income  net of corporate  taxes and net of payments  of interest, principal, and dividends
are retained  by the firm. These retained  earnings  result in an appreciation  in the value of the corporation.
The appreciation  is taxable  as capital  gains income  to the shareholder. In many tax systems, capital gains
are taxed at a reduced statutory  rate relative to dividend  and interest income. Even in the absence  of an
explicit statutory rate reduction for capital gain income, capital gains face a lower effectivL  tax rate than
dividend income.  This is because capital gains are generally taxed only when the stock is sold, rather
than as the gains accrue. The deferral of taxation  is equivalent  to a rate reduction. The longer the period
of time between the date of accrual and the date of realization, the greater is the equivalent rate
reduction. 3 We can define Tre as the tax rate at the shareholder  level on retained earnings that would
result in the same present value of tax collections  as a capital gains tax paid when stock is sold.
2A fully integrated tax system gives a dividend recipient credit for income taxes paid by the
corporation.  In this  case the original Modigliani-Miller result found in  the absence of taxation
(indifference  between debt and equity) holds.
3Capital gains not realized before death of the stockholder  may even escape taxation  entirely, as in
the U.S.  The heir may be liable only for tax on the appreciation  of the stock from the date the stock was
inherited.
-4-Assuming  a constant  ratio of dividend  payments  to retained  earnings,  the effective  rate of taxation
of equity income at the shareholder  level can be considered  a weighted  average of the effective  tax rates
applying  to dividends,  - 3d, and capital  gains, rre.  Assume  that the corporation  chooses  a dividend  payout
ratio which results in an overall effective  rate of taxatiorn  of re on equity income, where -e  =Brd  +  (1-
l)7re and (  is the proportion of the firm's after-tax  earnings  paid as dividends. 4
Let us consider the effect of the differential  rates of taxation on debt and equity income on the
initial  financing  choice  of the firm. Assume  initially  that the investment  project has a certain return. One
can solve for the relationship  between  the pretax returns this project must have to satisfy  bondholders  (rb)
or equity holders (re).  If the entire project is financed with debt, no corporate tax liability will be
assessed  (since  debt  payments  are deductible  from corporate  income), and after-tax  income  of bondholders
is rb(l  - Tb).  Alternatively, if the project is financed with a new equity issue, both corporate and
personal taxes are paid on  the income generated by  the investment, yielding after-tax income of
re(l  - rc)(l  - T7) to the shareholders. The source of financing  which results in the highest after-tax  return
will be  chosen.  Investors are indifferent to  the source of financing if  and only if  rb(l  - Tb) =
re(l - - Te). If we assume  the pretax income  of the project is independent  of its source of financing
(rb=re),  debt will be preferred if the tax burden on interest income, rb, is less than the total of corporate
and  shareholder level taxes paid on  equity income, rT +  Te(l  - rc).  Alternatively, if  (1 - Tb) <
(1 - Td(l  - Tr,  then investors' incomes  are maximized  by the firm issuing equity.
Modigliani-Miller  show that this same inequality  governs the choice between debt and equity
when the return to equity  income is uncertain,  provided  there is no risk of bankruptcy. Modigliani-Miller
propose how a shareholder  can 1 - sow  on his or her own to create  an earnings  stream from an unlevered
firm that is identical to that (in expectations)  from a levered firm of the same risk.  (A demonstration  is
4Section I. C will examine  what factors a firm may consider in choosing  whether to retain earnings
or pay income as dividends. For now, we will ignore how tfiis choice is made.
-5-given in Appendix A.)
The Modigliani-Miller  proof suggests  that under many plausible  values for tax variables, a firm
could increase its value by increasing  its leverage. In the extreme,  a firm would  be almost  entirely debt
financed, except for some residual equity.
B.  Miller Equilibrium
Miller (1977) suggests  a slightly  different equilibrium  relationship  between debt and equity. In
this equilibrium,  there is a unique economy-wide  optimal  debt-equity  ratio, yet no firm has an incentive
to alter its own debt-equity  ratio.
Miller notes that under a progressive tax system there is a wide range of potential tax rates on
each source of financing.  For tax-exempt  investors, Tb =  Te =  0.  Other investors may face high tax
rates on interest income, such that Tb  >  Tc.  Preferential  tax treatment of capital gains may result in a
higher after-tax return from corporate equity than from debt for these investors.
Let r be the pretax return on a project to be funded.  Assuming  the returns from both debt and
equity are certain, investors will  prefer the source of finance  with the higher after-tax  return. Both equity
and debt will be issued in equilibrium  if there are some investors who receive a higher after-tax return
by lending and others who receive a higher return by purchasing  equity.  There may exist a marginal
investor  who is just indifferent  between  holding  debt and equity. For this marginal  taxpayer, (1 - r*)  =
(1 - r )(1  - r*), where the asterisk  denotes  the tax rate of this investor. The economy-wide  ratio of debt
and equity is determined  by the quantity  of investment  undertaken  by individuals  with tax rates above  and
below the  marginal investor. For investors  with low tax rates, it is likely that (1 - Tb)  >  (1 - Td(l  - -r).
These investors will prefer debt to equity.  Investors in high tax brackets may find the inequality
reversed, and prefer holding equity to  debt.  Debt issued by the corporate sector is purchased by
taxpayers in increasingly  higher tax brackets.  Equilibrium  is achieved  when the amount of investment
in the economy is financed at its lowest possible cost.  This will result in a unique debt-equity  ratio for
-6-the economy,  but there is no advantage  to any firm from changing  its own debt-equity  ratio.
When  Miller proposed  this equilibrium  theory of finance  the United  States  had personal  tax rates
on interest income  as high as 70 percent, while the tax rate for large corporations  was 48 percent. These
high tax bracket investors may have received  a higher after-tax return through equity rather than debt.
Subsequent  tax changes in the U.S. in 1981 and 1986  lowered the rate of individual  taxation relative to
that of corporations. By 1986, the highest  personal  tax rate on interest income was less than the statutory
corporate tax rate.  As a result, the Miller equilibrium  would now suggest a greater reliance on debt
finance for newly established  firms.
C.  The Financing  Choice of Existing Firms
The analysis  of Modigliani-Miller  (1958) and Miller (1977) can be viewed as an analysis  of the
choice of the optimal initial capital structure when the firm is first founded. If there is any equity at the
time the corporation is first established, however, retained earnings may be an additional source of
financing available  to the firm when subsequent  financing  is needed.
Stiglitz  (1973) suggests  a life-cycle  view of a firm.  In return for contributing  an initial idea of
value, the founder of a corporation receives an equity share in the firm.  The firm requires additional
external funds to undertake the investment  necessary  to carry out this idea.  Whether to finance this
investment  through debt or new shares is the focus of Modigliani-Miller  (1958, 1963)  and Miller (1977).
In subsequent  periods, earnings  of the initial investment  may exceed interest payments on the
firm's debt.  These earnings constitute  a third source of finance for furffier  investment. The firm has
three financing  possibilities  now: retained  earnings, new share issues,  or debt. King (1977)  examines  the
consequences  of the use of these alternative  sources of finance.
King considers the real investment  of the firm constant under each financing choice.  Thus, a
decision  to reduce the use of retained earnings  this period, requires either an increase in new share issues
-7-or an increase in borrowing  to keep investment  constant. Each of these policies, while not affecting  the
real investment  of the firm, alters the time path of dividends  paid per share of stock, and therefore will
in general affect the share value of the firm, King examines  the effects  of small perturbations  in the use
of these sources of finance on share value.  The firm is assumed to choose the source of finance which
maximizes  the current share value of the firm.
Consider the decision  by the firm to increase  the use of new share issues  this period and reduce
retained earnings  by an equal amount,  holding the firm's debt policy unchanged. This causes  dividends
to increase in the present period.  In all subsequent  periods, the total amount of dividends  paid by the
firm will be the same as without  the perturbation. Dividends  per share, however, will be lower because
the firm's earnings are now distributed  among a larger number of shares.  If the after-tax present value
of the flow of income per share is higher under this policy than the alternative,  then share value will be
maximized  by adopting  the policy. King (1977, ch. 4) shows that the policy of new share issues will be
preferred to the use of retained earnings  only if Td <  rre.  This is because a unit of earnings  retained
by the firm results in tax liability of Tre. A unit of earnings  paid in dividends  causes tax liability  of Td.
Assuming  Tre is never greater than Td, the firm will always prefer the use of retained earnings to new
share issues.
If retained earnings are always preferred to new share issues, then it is worthwhile  for the firm
to reduce new share issues to zero.  Similarly, if the firm has retained earnings in excess of current
investment needs, the firm could reduce shareholder tax liability by repurchasing shares rather than
paying dividends.  Stiglitz (1973), King (1977), and Auerbach (1979) suggest that there may be legal
restrictions on the ability of firms to regularly repurchase shares in lieu of paying dividends. 5 With
restrictions on share repurchases, a firm with no investment  opportunities and positive earnings could
5In the U.S., the effect of the legal restrictions are unlikely to constrain  most firms.  The presence
of dividend  payments is then likely the result of non-tax  factors that are omitted from this analysis.
-8-acquire other companies  as a means of disbursing  the earnings  in a manner creating capital gains rather
than dividend  tax liability. Finally, if there are restrictions on the acquisition  of other firms, a firm will
only pay dividends if a unit of retained earnings  increases share value by less than (1 - rd)/(l  - -rrd.6
If new share issues are kept constant, a decision  to reduce retained earnings  this period requires
an increase in corporate debt to maintain  a constant  level of investment. This policy will result in higher
current dividends, but lower dividends in the subsequent  period in order to repay the principal and
interest on this debt. The policy will increase  share value if the shareholders  value this stream of income
at a greater present value than the alternative. If the shareholders' discount  rate is greater than the cost
of borrowing to the firm, this perturbation  increases firm value.  King (1977) shows this requires that
(1  - Tb)  >  (1 - Tred( 1 - r)d  Alternatively  this inequality  can  be interpreted  as requiring  that the reduction
in borrowing costs to a shareholder exceed the after-tax return from reinvesting the earnings in the
corporation.
A sufficient condition for debt to be preferred to retained earnings is that the rate of personal
taxation  is less than the rate of corporate taxation. Debt may also dominate  retained earnings  when the
personal  tax rate is greater than the corporate  tax rate, provided  the tax rate on capital  gains is sufficiently
high.  There would appear to be a range of tax rates over which debt is preferred to retained earnings.
A Tax-Induced  Financing  Hierarchy?
The results of the analysis  in this section have focused only on the effects of taxation  on the mix
of financing for a firm.  The analysis  suggests that debt finance and retained earnings are tax-favored
relative to new share issues.  For a range of tax parameters, debt-finance  may be favored relative to
6An important implication  of this model noted by Auerbach (1979) is that a positive tax rate on
dividends  does not discourage  corporate investment  if retained earnings  are sufficient  to meet investment
needs.  The dividend tax in this case encourages  investment  to a point where a unit of new investment
is valued at less than a unit by the stock market.  Increases in the dividend tax rate could actually lead
the firm to undertake greater investment  by reducing  the opportunity  cost of retained earnings.
-9-retained earnings as well.
Mayer (1990)  presents a comparison  of the extent  to which retained  earnings, debt and new share
issues were used to finance new investment  in Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and she United States between 1970 and 1985.  In all countries, despite varying tax
treatment, retained earnings  were the dominant  source of finance, although its importance  varied across
countries. For example,  retained earnings  were the source of finance for virtually all net investment  in
the  United Kingdom, while financing just  over  half of  net investment in  Italy.  Cross  country
comparisons, however, were unable to find a correlation between the relative tax treatment of each
financing source and its use.
In developing  countries  internal finance is also the primary source of funds for most enterprises.
Studies surveyed in Kilby et. al. (1984) note that the original source of funds in rural manufacturing
enterprises is predominantly  from personal saving or informal loans from relatives. Future expansion
is also largely financed  from retained earnings. External  finance is of limited importance  and that which
is received is frequently  from customers  rather than from formal lending institutions.
Recent research  has examined  differences  between  investment  financed  from internal  and external
sources at the firm level.  Auerbach (1984) finds that ex post rates of return are generally  higher when
financed  with new share issues  than when financed  with retained  earnings. The finding  supports  the idea
that each source of financing  has a distinct  opportunity  cost. For example,  firms may only resort to new
share issues if the projects are sufficiently  profitable  to cover the higher tax-costs  of external finance.
Auerbach's finding also suggests that certain firms may be unable to receive debt financing for these
projects, since debt would otherwise  be preferred to new equity from a tax perspective.
Other research  has examined  differences  in investment  behavior  across  firms experiencing  changes
in cash flow.  A tax-related theory would suggest little effect of cash-flow on investment  behavior for
firms which are presently paying dividends.  For these firms, any investment  opportunities could be
-10-financed by reducing dividend  payments.  For firms not paying dividends, increases in cash flow may
give the firm access to tax-favored retained earnings to finance investment.  Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988a)  find that these predictions  hold for a large sample  of publicly  traded firms in the United
States,  even after controlling  for investment  opportunities  available  to the firm using standard  neoclassical
models.
Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen believe the strong effect of increases in the availability  of internal
funds for low-dividend  paying  firms is greater than would be predicted by taxes only.  They argue that
these firms are likely to face non-tax constraints  limiting  the availability  of external  funds. They suggest
that the costs of asymmetric  information  may preclude  these firms from undertaking  profitable  investment
opportunities. The next section of this paper will examine  non-tax costs and benefits associated  with the
use of the alternative  sources of finance.
-11-III.  Financing Choices  under Asymmetric  Information
As noted in the conclusion  to the last section, the tax-guided  view of corporate finance has been
unable to explain  adequately  the observed mix of financing  by corporations  in different countries. While
consistent with the predominant use of  retained earnings over new share issues, it may not be  a
satisfactory  explanation  for the low use of debt finance. This section will present an alternative  theory
of finance  based on the assumption  of asymmetric  information. The discussion  in this section frequently
considers investment  to be undertaken by a firm.  This is not intended to preclude application  of the
material to family  enterprises, single  entrepreneurs,  or farmers. Indeed, some of the earliest applications
of information  asymmetries  were to small units of production, such as sharecroppers. 7 As noted by
Hoff and Stiglitz (1990), the problems of asymmetric  information  may be even more severe in credit
markets of developing  economies, especially  rural areas, where formal legal institutions  are especially
costly and ineffective  and formal information-sharing  networks are scarce or nonexistent. Section IV
examines specific mechanisms in  rural  economies established to  limit problems of  asymmetric
information.
Under asymmetric  information  it is assumed that the managers  of the firm have some superior
information  on the characteristics  of the firm's assets and investment  opportunities  that investors do not
have.  This information  asymmetry can lead to managers undertaking activities  that make some of the
firm's claimants  worse off.
If investors are aware that management  may take actions  from time to time that make  them worse
off, they will attempt  to contract for this contingency. However  to monitor  and enforce  these restrictions
can be very costly. Thus, the problems of asymmetric  information  can only be pardy overcome.
One facet of the literature on asymmetric  information  has focused on the divergence  of interests
7See Stiglitz (1974) for an early analysis  of the role of information  asymmetries  in sharecropping.
Singh (1989)  presents a recent survey on this subject.
-12-of the firm's managers from the shareholders  of the firm.  In this literature, for example  Jensen and
Meckling (1976), managers are seen to act in their own in.erest as employees, rather than as agents for
the owners of the firm.  The managers  may then fail to maximize shareholder  value by pursuing goals
which augment  their own welfare.
Another set of literature has focused on the potential conflicts of the different claimants of the
firm, notably shareholders  and bondholders. Here, even if the firm's managers act in the interest of the
shareholders, actions which would maximize  firm value are not generally consistent with those actions
which would maximize share value.  In a wide set of cases it can be shown that shareholders  will favor
this deviation  from firm value maximization  ex post. However, if the firm's debt holders can anticipate
deviations from firm value maximization, the shareholders will at least partly bear the cost of this
deviation ex ante.  Thus, it can be in the shareholders' interest to find mechanisms  which successfully
limit the possibility for  the  firm's  managers to  undertake policies that  deviate from  firm value
maximization. Where the firm is unable to control these deviations ex ante, the firm may find itself
borrowing at costs greater than otherwise  or it may be denied credit entirely.
A.  Bankruptcy  as an Inadequate  Explanation
One traditional explanation  for a limit on the quantity of a firm's investment  financed  by debt is
the increasing probability of default as the firm's  debt obligations increase.  If operating income is
uncertain, the firm is more likely to experience  periods in which income is insufficient  to service the
firm's debt load when the debt is large.  However, if changes  in the firm's financing mix do not affect
the firm's real investments,  this increasing  risk of bankruptcy  will not affect the total value of the firm
unless there are costs incurred in the act of bankruptcy, i.e., unless it is costly to transfer assets to the
debt holders.
To see this, recall the payoff structure of the debt and equity claims.  Let V(s) be the value of
the firm in some state of nature s.  The value of debt instruments  of this firm in state s, Vd, is equal to
-13-min[V(s), P], where P is the promised payment of interest and principal. The value of equity, Ve, is
equal to max[O,  V(s)-P].  Note that the sum of the payoffs to debt and equity in all states s is simply
V(s).  The value of the flrm is independent  of its division  between debt and equity claims.  The firm
could be entirely debt financed or entirely equity financed and its value would be unchanged. Thus, a
simple story of increasing risk of bankruptcy cannot create a limit on debt finance if bankruptcy is
costless.
If there are costs incurred in bankruptcy, then ownership of the firm cannot be costlessly
transferred to the firm's debt holders. These costs include  the direct legal costs and the indirect costs of
operating  a firm near bankruptcy. Legal costs could  be high if it is expected  that the firm's shareholders
will resist transfer of the firm.  A firm near bankruptcy may find increased indirect costs if it is more
difficult  to receive commitments  from suppliers and customers.
The direct costs of bankruptcy,  however, have been found to be relatively small. For example,
Warner (1977)  examined  the direct costs of bankruptcy  for eleven  U.S. railroads  between 1930  and 1955.
He finds that the average cost of bankruptcy  was equal to one percent of the value of the firm, where the
firm  value is measured seven years prior to bankruptcy. The expected cost of bankruptcy  is even less.
Thus, bankruptcy  costs alone are an inadequate  explanation  for limits on debt-finance.
B.  Asymmetric  Information and Bankruptcy  Risk
The shortcoming of the pure bankruptcy story is in its failure to incorporate the effects of
asymmetric  information. Bankruptcy (and more generally limited liability) can alter the shareholders'
preference ordering of alternative  projects relative to those that would be undertaken to maximize firm
value.  Here, firm value is taken to be the sum of the value of the equity and debt claims. If the set of
projects available to  the firm at any point in time is not known to the firm's  bondholders, then
bondholders  will be unable to write contracts that prevent this deviation  from firm value maximization.
In such a case, the firm may be unable to finance its projects.
-14-One set of deviations  from firm value  maximization  occurs because  the value of the shareholders'
equity claim is a convex function of the returns on the finn's  investments.  As a result, the firm's
shareholders  will prefer riskier investments  to safer investments  with the same expected  yield. The payoff
to bondholders is a concave function  of the firm's returns.  Bondholders  prefer less risky investments  to
riskier investments  with the same expected yield.  If the risk characteristics  of projects available to the
firm are not known to lenders, the firm can transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders by
undertaking riskier projects than those contemplated  by the firm's lenders.  The firm may have this
incentive even if the riskier projects have a lower expected return.  Further, because the firm is not
concerned with the return on its investments  in states of bankruptcy,  the expected  return to shareholders
from additional  equity-financed  investment  can  be less than the joint return to the firms' bondholders  and
shareholders. As a result, the firm may fail to undertake investment  opportunities  that would have been
profitable to undertake in the absence  of debt.
Both of these factors - changes  in the composition  of the riskiness  of investment  and changes  in
the level of investment  - can cause flrm value to decrease in the presence of debt.  Bondholders
anticipate  that shareholders  will undertake all actions that maximize share value, not necessarily firm
value.  Thus, debt can only be obtained if the expected  return to debt holders is sufficient  to compensate
them for these anticipated  actions. This compensation  may take the form of higher  interest rates.  In this
case, a firm's shareholders  bear the cost of this anticipated  deviation.
Higher interest rates, however, may lead the firm to shift to still riskier projects.  As shown by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), in this case an equilibrium can exist where some firms are simply denied
credit, while observationally  equivalent  firms receive credit.  The excess demand for credit can persist
in equilibrium. Lenders who raise interest rates receive lower returns on their loans because  they attract
a riskier set of borrowers.
The following sections will examine the consequences of debt finance in the presence of
-15-asymmetric  information.
C.  Suboptimal  Investment  in the Presence of Asymmetric  Information
A variety of models have been developed to portray the inefficiencies  which can occur under
asymmetric  information  with debt finance. These  models  inciude  Bernanke  and Gertler (1990), Calomiris
and Hubbard (1990), de Meza and Webb (1987), Leland and Pyle (1977), Myers (1977), and Stiglitz  and
Weiss (1981). These models conclude  that the presence of asymmetric  information  leads to either over-
or under-investment  relative  to the social  optimum. In the absence  of asymmetric  information,  the first-
best outcome could be achieved.
In these models,  the firm is assumed  to have  better information  on the distribution  of returns from
a potential  project than the firm's lenders. Where lenders cannot  distinguish  among  firms, all firms must
pay the same interest rate on their loans in equilibrium. As a result, firms undertaking 'better" projects
(for example,  projects with above  average expected  rates of return to lenders due to greater probabilities
of success), subsidize firms undertaking "worse" projects.  Firms with better projects therefore pay a
premium relative  to ihe rates they would pay if lenders were privy to the information  known  to the firm.
Finns with better projects that are able to raise capital from internal funds to undertake the investment
are then able to capture the full benefit of their projects.
Thus, asymmetric  information  can cause a divergence  between the yield required on a project
funded from internal sources versus that required on a project funded externally.  A firm may be
considered finance constrained if internal funds are exhausted before the firm has been unable to
undertake all projects with yields in excess of the firm's opportunity cost of capital, yet the projects'
yields are insufficient  to cover the cost of external  funds. Alternatively,  the information  asymmetry  may
lead to credit rationing. Funds may be denied  to the firm despite  the firm's willingness  to pay the market
rate of  interest.  In  either case, a marginal change in the quantity of  internal funds available for
investment  can have a positive effect on investment,  while a marginal change in the cost of obtaining
-16-external  funds might have no effect.  Traditional  analyses  of the effects  of taxation  on investment
behavior,  such  as the Hall-Jorgenson  (1967)  cost  of capital  model,  focus  on the effect  of a tax change  on
the required  marginal  return  of capital,  assuming  the source  of funds  is perfectly  elastic. As indicated
by Fazzari,  Hubbard,  and  Petersen  (1988b),  however,  changes  in the average  profitability  of capital  may
be more important  for finance  constrained  firms.
In this section,  the effects  of asymmetric  information  on the investment  undertaken  by a firm  in
the presence  of debt finance  are presented  using models  representing  two different  types  of financing
decisions  for the firm.  While these two models  cannot  fully portray  the full range of effects  of
asymmetric  information  on the  financial  and  investment  decisions  of a firm,  conclusions  drawn  from  these
models  are representative  of those  based  on more  specialized  models  in the literature.
The first model  is based  on de Meza  and Webb (1987).8 In this model,  a firm is seeking  to
borrow  funds  for a project  with  an uncertain  probability  of success.  The  second  model  is  based  on Myers
(1977).9  A  firm  in this  model  uses  both  debt  and  equity.  The firm  has future  projects  which  it may  seek
to undertake  at a later date by issuing  additional  equity. These models  encompass  a wide variety  of
potential  investment  decisions  of firms.
1.  Over-Investment  or Under-lnvestment  with Asymmetric  Information
A common  model  to demonstrate  the effects  of asymmetric  information  on investment  is to
assume  that the  population  consists  of a set of entrepreneurs,  each  with  access  to a unique  risky  project.
The project  of entrepreneur  i is assumed  to have  two possible  outcomes:  success,  in which  case the
project's  return  is R$;  or failure,  in which  case  the project's  return is Rf. Thb  probability  of success  is
Pi.  A project  requires  total  investment  k.  Each  entrepreneur  has the same  wealth  w, which  is less  than
8 With modifications,  this model  can also be used to analyze  the findings  of Stiglitz  and Weiss
(1981),  Bernanke  and Gertler  (1990),  and  Calomiris  and Hubbard  (1990).
9This  model  has been  modified  by Long  and  Malitz  (1985).
-17-k.  It is assumed  that lenders know the  joint distributions  of project returns and success  probabilities,  but
cannot distinguish  among entrepreneurs. As a result, all entrepreneurs  who receive loans borrow at the
same interest rate r.  Entrepreneurs  are assumed  to know more about their own risk characteristics  than
lenders, creating a problem of asymmetric information.
The heterogeneity  of investors is simplified  by assuming  either (a) the probability  of success Pi
is the same for all entrepreneurs but project returns RS and Rf vary across entrepreneurs, or (b) the
probability  of success differs across entrepreneurs  but project returns are identical. Let us first examine
the model under this latter assumption,  as assumed by de Meza and Webb (1987) and Bernanke and
Gertler (1990).  We will later examine an alternative  assumption  and see that the results of the model
change as shown by de Meza and Webb.
Assume  that all entrepreneurs  have identical  wealth and identical  project sizes.  An entrepreneur
borrows B=k-w from lenders if the project is undertaken. It is assumed  that Rs >  (1+r)B  >  Rf 2  0.
If the project fails, the entrepreneur  defaults on the loan.  Entrepreneurs are assumed to know their
probabilities  of success and are risk-neutral.
An entrepreneur undertakes his or her project provided the expected return from the project
exceeds the opportunity  cost.  The opportunity  cost is assumed to be the safe rate of interest p offered
by a bank on .ts savings accounts  in which the entrepreneur  could have saved wealth w. An entrepreneur
i then undertakes  his or her project provided
(1.1)  Pi(R  - (1+r)B)  ;  (1 +  p)w.
The marginal project undertaken, that is, the entrepreneur  for which equation (1.1) holds with
equality,  has the lowest probability  of success  of those  projects  undertaken. Let us denote this probability
by p',  so
(1.1')  p(Rs  - (I+r)B)  = (1 + p)w.
The profits to a competitive  banking industry  from lending to all entrepreneurs  must be zero in
-18-equilibrium. If the banking  industry earn, profits on projects with high probabilities  of success, it must
lose profits on loans to projects with the lowest success  probabilities. Thus the return to the bank on the
marginal  project with success probability  p' is less than the cost of funds to the bank,
(1.2)  p'(1+r)B  +  (1-p')Rf <  (1 + p)B.
Finally, the socially optimal level of investment  is to undertake all investment  for which the
expected  return exceeds  the opportunity  cost, or
(1.3)  piRs +  (1-pi)Rf 2  (1 + p)k.
Note that for the marginal  project with success  probability  p',  adding equations  (1.1') and (1.2)
(and noting that w+B=k)  shows that the expected  return from this project is less than its opportunity
cost,
(1.3')  p'R5 +  (1-p')Rf <  (1 + p)k.
In this model, asymmetric  information  leads to over-investment  relative to the social optimum.
Poor investments,  that is, investments  with an expected  return less than the economy-wide  opportunity
cost of capital, are undertaken because  the entrepreneur  is not concerned  with the return on the project
in states  of default. Banks  lose profits on loans to low-probability-of-success  entrepreneurs. These  losses
are just offset by the profits earned on high-probability-of-success  entrepreneurs. Note that a bank in a
competitive  market cannot make greater profits by either rationing loans or by charging a different
interest rate than the competitive  rate on loans.  There is no advantage  to rationing since the expected
profitability  on each loan is zero.  It cannot charge a higher rate than other banks charge either.  If it
charges a lower rate,  it attracts all current entrepreneurs and new entrepreneurs with even lower
probabilities  of success.
Entrepreneurs  with high probabilities  of success  pay higher interest rates than they would if their
success probabilities  were known to lenders. Because they are unable to identify themselves  to banks,
they end up subsidizing  the low-probability-of-success  entrepreneurs. It is worth noting the effects of
-19-changes in the wealth of entrepreneurs  on the equilibrium  level of investment. A marginal  increase in
the wealth of a high-probability-of-success  entrepreneur would allow the entrepreneur  to increase the
expected  profit from undertaking the project. 10 This entrepreneur  would reduce borrowing.  On the
other hand, a marginal increase in the wealth of an entrepreneur with success probability p'  (from
equation 1.1  ') would cause  this entrepreneur  to now reject the project. If the wealth  of each entrepreneur
were greater than the project size, the optimal  level of investment  would  always  be undertaken. Bernanke
and Gertler (1990) and Calomiris and Hubbard (1990)  further analyze  the effects  of changes in the level
and distribution  of wealth  in an economy. Entrepreneurs  in developing  economies,  faced with a low le7  el
of personal wealth, may be able to undertake  projects of only limited size given their inability  to raise
sufficient  collateral.
It is important  to note, however, that no project with expected  returns greater than the opportunity
cost of capital is denied funds in the model presented above. de Meza and Webb (1987) show that this
result is dependent on the assumption  that all projects have the same return Rs if successful.  If,
alternatively,  it is assumed  that all projects have the same expected  return, but both the probability  of
success  Pi and the return if successful  R$  vary, then entrepreneurs  may be credit rationed. This replicates
the finding of Stiglitz  and Weiss (1981) that projects with expected  returns greater than the opportunity
cost of capital may go unfunded.  The proportion of successful and unsuccessful  entrepreneurs in the
population  who receive loans is the same as in the population  of entrepreneurs  denied loans.
In this modified  model, the entrepreneur  who is indifferent  between undertaking  the project and
receiving  the safe return p on his or her wealth has the highest  probability  of success.  (See Appendix
10The entrepreneur's expected  profit from undertaking  the project relative to his opportunity  cost is
(from equation 1.1) pi(Rs - (1  +r)B) - (I  +  p)w.  Differentiating  with respect to w yields, pi(l + r)dw -
(I  + p)dw, where use of the identity  B=k-w has been made. Let us assume  here that Rf=0.  Since  the
banking sector in equilibrium makes zero profit, p=rp,  where p is the average probability of success.
Thus, entrepreneurs  with Pi >  P have an increase in expected  profit, while those with pi  <  p have a
decrease in expected  profit.
-20-B for an explanation  of this outcome.) As a result, increases  in the lending rate r cause  the entrepreneurs
with the highest  probability  of success  not to undertake  their projects. This increases  the riskiness  of the
projects funded by the bank.  If the increased  riskiness of these projects reduces profits to the bank by
more than the increase in profits from the higher rate paid by successful projects, an equilibrium  with
rationing results. Here, too little investment  is undertaken  when entrepreneurs  require loans to undertake
their projects.  Table 1 summarizes  the different outcomes  of these two models.
Table 1
Asymmetric  Information  with Debt Finance
Type of uneertainty in model  Outcome
Uncertain probability  of success  Over-investment
(de Meza-Webb, 1987)
Uncertain payoff if successful  Under-investment
(Stiglitz-Weiss,  1981)
As in the earlier model presented, the entrepreneurs with high-probability-of-success  projects
subsidize entrepreneurs  with lower probabilities  of success.  Because lenders are unable to distinguish
among  entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs  with "better"  projects are affected  by credit rationing  along with the
entrepreneurs  with "worse" projects. Although  in the presentation  of this model it was assumed  that the
expected  returns to all projects are the same, it is possible that projects with the highest probabilities  of
success also have the higher expected  rates of return.  In this case, asymmetric information  results in
some  poorer projects  receiving  funding  while  better projects  go unfunded. While asymmetric  information
can result in either over- or under-investment  in these  models, the models  concur in the finding  that there
can  be a divergence  between  the required  return on internally  generated  funds and that required if external
-21-funds are sought.
2.  Myers' (1977) Model of Debt and Under-Investment
Myers (1977)  demonstrates  how a partly debt-financed  firm may undertake  less than the optimal
amount  of investment  in the presence  of asymmetric  information. In this model, firm value is composed
of the value of existing assets  and future  growth opportunities. The growth  opportunities  require a future
investment,  and the returns from the future investment  depend  on the state of nature. The state of nature
is revealed to the firm before the subsequent investment  is made.  The value today of these growth
opportunities  is the present value of the returns from these opportunities  less the cost of undertaking  the
investment in those states of nature where the investment is undertaken.  Myers shows that growth
opportunities which would be undertaken  by an unleveraged  firm in some states of nature will not be
undertaken  by the leveraged firm. Thus, the net present value of the growth opportunities  is less in the
leveraged  firm.  If bondholders  can ccrrectly anticipate  thl, states of nature in which the firm will fail to
exercise the growth option, then there can be no transfer of wealth from bondholders  to shareholders.
In this case, the loss in firm value is borne by the shareholders.
Consider an unlevered firm with no existing assets in period zero which is valued for a single
growth opportunity  which can be exercised  at the beginning  of period one.  The growth opportunity  will
require equity-financed  investment  at that time of I, and yield returns of V(s) in state s.  Let the states
of nature be ordered in increasing  profitability  of the investment  opportunity. The growth option will
be exercised then for all s 2  sw where sa is the state of nature such that V(sa) = I.  The value of the
firm in period zero if investors are risk-neutral can then be written as
(2.1)  V  =  E{#-[V(s) - I  I s  2  saI} Pr(s  2  sd,
where fl is the one-period  discount rate, and Pr(-) denotes  the probability  of the event.
Now consider  the effect on firm value if the firm issues  debt to repurchase  shares of initial equity
owners before the state of nature is revealed to the firm.  The firm value is unaffected  by the issuance
-22-of debt in period  zero if the debt  holders  are free to undertake  the investment  opportunity  in the event
that the shareholders  default. The  value  of the firm's remaining  equity  after  the debt  is issued  is
(2.2)  Ve =  E{l [V(s)  - I - P I s 2  sblV-Pr(s  2  Sb),
where  P is the payment  of interest  and principal,  sb is the state of nature  such that V(sb)  = I + P,
S  > sa. The  shareholders  choose  to exercise  the  growth  opportunity  requiring  equity  contribution  I only
if it is sufficiently  profitable  to cover  the cost  of investment  and the debt  service.
The value  of the firm's debt is
(2.3)  Vd = E{i min[P,V(s)  - I I s  t  sal][Pr(s >  sa).
If the shareholders  default  (s < Sb)  and  s 2 sa, the  debt  holders  find it worthwhile  to invest  the quantity
I required  to carry  out the  project. If P is considered  the face  value  of the firm's bonds,  then  the bonds
are issued  at a discount  from  face  value  of 1 - (V/P).
Note  that  in this case  the sum  of the value  of the debt  and  equity  claims  given  by equations  (2.2)
and  (2.3) is equal  to the value  of the unlevered  firm  shown  in equation  (2.1). Here  debt  does  not reduce
the value  of the firm. The wealth  of the initial  equity  owners  is equal  to V in both cases. Where  debt
is issued,  the equity  owners  receive  an immediate  payment  of Vd and  have  remaining  equity  equal  to Ve.
The wealth  of the initial  equity  owners  is the same  in either  case.
If, however,  the investment  opportunity  is assumed  to vanish  if not undertaken  by the firm's
owners,  then  the value  of the firm  is dependent  on the amount  of debt  borrowed. Consider  the value  to
debt holders of bonds promising  the same uncertain  payment  P next period under this alternative
assumption.  Bondholders  know  this  payment  will  only  be received  if s k  sb. Further,  if Sb  > s 2  s 8a
the bondholders  receive  nothing,  since  they  are unable  to exercise  the growth  option. The value  of the
firms  debt, Va, in this case  is
(2.4)  Va = Ef# [P I s k  sb]l)Pr(s > sb).
Note that Va is strictly less than Vd given by equation  (2.3).  However,  the value of the
-23-remaining  equity V; is the same as given by equation (2.2).  Thus, the value of the levered firm V'=
VA +  Ve  is less than the value of the unlevered firm. The wealth  of the initial equity owners, equal to
their receipt of Va in cash and their remaining  equity share V',  is reduced  by the issuance of debt.
Myers  (1977)  suggests  that for many  firms the value of future  growth  opportunities  may constitute
an important  part of firm value.  Additionally,  the value of existing assets can be dependent on future
discretionary  spending  by the firm on activities  such as maintenance  and advertising. To the extent that
the proper level of these expenditures  is known in advance, a contract could be written requiring these
investments  in amounts  depending  on the state of nature. However, it is unlikely that the state of nature
could be revealed sufficiently  to outsiders to allow for proper legal enforcement  of the contract.  The
alternative  is to require a minimum  level of investment  independent  of the state of nature.  This would
avoid the problem of asymmetric  information  for these investments  for states of nature s  >  sa, but result
in over-investment  for s  <  sa.  The over-investment  in these activities  in poor states of nature reduces
the value of the growth options. Again, it is the equity holders who bear this loss.
Further, for many activities the presence of an investment  opportunity may be unknown to
outsiders. Consider  for example  a firm's research  and development  (R&D)  program. The R&D program
may  be  expected to  generate numerous growth opportunities, although the  exact  number and
characteristics  of the projects may  be difficult  to ascertain  in advance. As a result, discoveries  which are
known to lead to small, but positive, net present values may not be carried out by the firm's managers.
Bondholders  could not contract  for these discoveries  to be carried out, because  by their very nature they
are not known in advance.  Even if, upon default, the bondholders did learn of the existence of a
discovery,  management  could  argue that the project was not expected  to yield a positive present value.
Although  the example  presented  above is based on a firm with no existing  assets and only growth
opportunities,  the conclusions  of the model apply to fms  with existing  assets and growth opportunities,
provided  there is some risk of bankruptcy. Because  the levered firm will follow through on less of its
-24-profitable growth opportunities, the equity holders in a levered firm will value these opportunities  at a
reduced value relative to the equity owners of an unlevered firm.  A firm will then ordinarily prefer to
not issue risky debt, if it wishes to take advantage  of potential future growth options.  The firm will use
internal funds first to finance its investments,  and only if these are insufficient  consider financing with
debt. Any debt-financed  investment  must have a sufficiently  high net present value that it increases  share
value by more than the loss in value resulting from the decline in value of the growth opportunities.
Himmelberg  and Petersen (1990) present empirical evidence  that R&D investments  are sensitive to the
availability  of internal funds, confirming  the hypothesis that firms can only raise outside funds for this
purpose at a higher cost.
The Myers model of asymmetric information, though formulated differently than the model
presented in the previous section, leads to a similar conclusion  that the cost to the firm of using external
funds is likely to exceed the cost of internal  funds.  If the firm's internal resources are low, it may be
unable to undertake all investments that it would at a higher level of profitability.  TMe  divergence
between the cos+  of internal and external funds may result in projects with positive net present values
going unfunded.IV.  Rural Credit Market Solutions to Asymmetric  Tnformation
Increasing attention has been given to the problems of informational  asymmetries  in financing
projects in the rural sectors of developing  countries. Informational  problems in these sectors are severe.
The mechanisms created to limit the impact of informational  asymmetries  offer interesting insights on
means of overcoming  these problems.
Informational  asymmetries  arise in a rural context in part because borrowers (largely farmers)
differ in their productivity  and the productivity  of their land. Lenders  therefore have a problem  of trying
to ascertain  the risk and possible collateral  of different borrowers.  Those with excellent collateral  may
be most able to receive loans  from the formal  sector (Floro and Yotopolous,  1991, Aleem, 1990). Poorer
borrowers may only receive loans from the informal sector. Even where collateral  might exist, poorly
-25-defined  legal rights in property  and high enforcement  costs may  preclude  borrowing  from the formal
sector.
Aleem  (1990)  presents  some  evidence  on the extent  of imperfect  information  in these  markets.
He finds  that  lenders  in the informal  sector  spend  an average  of one  day  to screen  loan  applicants.  After
this screening,  an average  of 50 percent  of the applicants  are rejected. Administrative  costs  associated
with  these  loans  were  estimated  to represent  40 to 50 percent  of the principal  borrowed.  Thus,  to a large
extent, lenders in the informal  sector are only able to overcome  the disadvantage  of asymmetric
information  by incurring  significant  costs  to gain  information  on their borrowers. Other  practices  or
mechanisms  are intended  to directly reduce the costs of  informational  asymmetries. Two such
mechanisms  are discussed  in the remainder  of this  section.  11
Intrlinkga  between  crdit  and ohermke.  One  manner  by which  lenders  minimize  these
informational  costs  is by lending  only to those  who  have  an additional  relationship  with  the supplier  of
credit,  such as a customer  or a supplier  of inputs. These  interlinkages  are intended  to reduce  the costs
of obtaining  information,  monitoring  behavior, or enforcing  repayment.  Bell (1989) notes how
interlinkages  can increase  the ability  of lenders  to shape  the behavior  of borrowers  without  adversely
affecting  risk. Consider  for example  a loan  to a supplier  of inputs. Aleem  notes  in his examination  of
rural  credit  markets  in Pakistan,  "In  general,  at  least  one  end  of the loan  transaction  involved  the delivery
of commodities,  with the loan  either  extended  or repaid  in kind." 12
Requiring  a farmer's crop as repayment  has several  features  which  minimize  the problems  of
informational  asymmetries. First, the lender  is given  a means  of measuring  the productivity  of the
1 For further  discussion  of these  and  other  mechanisms,  see  the  overview  paper  by Hoff  and Stiglitz
(1990).
12Aleem  notes  that  the high  occurrence  of loans  repaid  or lent  in kind in Pakistan  may  also  be a way
of avoiding  loans  bearing  fixed  interest  rates,  which  would  be considered  un-Islamic.  This interlinkage,
however,  is also  found  in other non-Islamic  developing  countries  (see Siamwalla  et al., 1990).
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appear as productive as possible.
Second, the crop represents  a form of collateral  which can be collected  by the lender at harvest
time.  For crops without fixed harvest periods, Siamwalla  et al. (1990) note that the land and standing
crop may be transferred to the lender for a fixed period of time.
Finally, purchase of the farmer's output ensures that the lender and not other borrowers has
access to information on the continuing  productivity  of the borrower.  By limiting knowledge  of the
borrower's characteristics  to other potential  lenders, the lender may be more able to enforce repayment
with the sanction of denial of credit in the event of default.  Where a borrower can quickly st  anew
with a new lender, this sanction  has no effect. However, where credit is only extended after establishing
a lengthy relationship,  default and the subsequent  denial of credit may be an important  incentive.
The practice of providing the initial loan in kind, for example, with seed or other inputs rather
than currency, also may reduce the costs of information  asymmetries. This practice gives the lender
greater control over the use of the loan proceeds  for the stated purpose and knowledge  of the production
technique  to be used.
Trade networks may result in credit being extended  from one level to another through a series
of trading relationships  (Floro and Yotopolous,  1991). Intermediate  firms in these relationships  may not
be net creditors, but conduits  through which credit flows to lower levels. This layering of credit makes
use of personalized trading relationships between parties that reduce the riskiness of the loans.  One
disadvantage  to the layering of credit is that transaction  costs are incurred at each level, even though no
net credit may occur at that particular level.
Interlinking  can have ambiguous  welfare consequences. Since a prior trading relationship  may
be necessary  before a borrower can  receive a loan, conditioning  a loan on the requirement  of an exclusive
trading arrangement  with the lender  gives the lender a monopoly  power. This allows  the lender to charge
-27-a higher effective rate of interest than might occur with competitive  markets.
The practice of interlinking Is not unique to rural credit markets.  Trade credit is common in
developed and developing countries.  Producers of  capital goods frequently provide financing for
purchasing or renting these goods.  Another type of interlinking is through a franchise, under which
credit may be extended in return for an exclusive  relationship  with the parent firm.
Peer monitoring. Siamwalla  et al. (1990)  and Stiglitz (1990) discuss  a mechanism  under which
a loan is received  by individuals  who form a group.  Each member of the group is jointly liable for the
debts of the other members of the group.  As Stiglitz  notes, the advantage  of such a system is that the
members of the group are better able to monitor the use of funds by an individual  borrower than the
lender.  This monitoring can ensure that a farmer does not use risky methods (or methods  riskier than
that which other members  of the group can tolerate) and does not shirk.  Pressure can be applied by the
fellow debtors on a non-compliant  borrower.  Further, because borrowers of similar risk have an
incentive  to pool together, the risk characteristics  of the group may be easier to ascertain  by the lender
than the characteristics  of any particular individual.
Peer monitoring can also lead to more efficient  production decisions. Consider  for example  the
Myers (1977) model discussed in the last section where a debt-financed  firm may in future periods
undertake suboptimal levels of investment.  An example in a rural context in the absence of peer
monitoring may be the following: A farmer receives a loan to finance the planting of a crop.  As the
crop develops, insect damage ravages  the crop.  This state of nature - insect damage  - is unobservable
to the lender, but not to the farmer.  An application  of pesticide  might be cost effective, but perhaps not
save a sufficient  amount of the crop to prevent default on the loan.  In this case, it is not in the farmer's
interest to apply the pesticide. This is inefficient  if the cost of the pesticide is less than the value of the
crops that could be saved through its application.
One way to prevent this inefficient  behavior is to mandate application  of pesticides at all times,
-28-regardless  of whether  it is necessary. Indeed, as noted  by Thrup (1990), agricultural  loans in developing
countries often require application of pesticides whether they are necessary or  not.  This,  too,  is
inefficient since expenditures  on pesticides  are wasted when crop damage from insects is minimal.
The peer monitoring  group may be an alternative  solution. Consider when a single farmer's crop
could benefit from application  of pesticide, even though the yield from the crop will be insufficient  to
prevent default on the farmer's loan.  The group, since it is jointly liable for the farmer's loan, would
have the appropriate  incentive  to apply  the pesticide  when  it is cost effective. The additional  expenditure
on the pesticide would reduce the group's liability when the loan of the individual  farmer is defaulted
upon.  Only at high monitoring costs could a lender achieve the same outcome as the peer monitoring
group.
The peer monitoring  group may be able to prevent this sort of inefficiency  only when the state
of nature requiring subsequent investment  is not strongly correlated across all members of the group.
For example, if all farmers simultaneously  experienced  insect damage, it might be in the interest of the
group not to apply pesticide and jointly default on the loan.  This general lack of risk diversification  are
disadvantages  of the peer monitoring system.  There is a tradeoff between peer group members being
located in the same area so as to maximize their ability to monitor and assist each other versus the
increased sensitivity  of all members to common  risks, such as enviromnental  conditions. Stig!itz (1990)
also notes that as the size of a peer monitoring  group expands, free-rider effects may reduce individual
incentives  to monitor the other members  of the group.  This disadvantage  must be weighed  against the
benefits of risk diversification  from expanding  group size.
Experience with one peer monitoring  group, the Grameen  Bank in Bangladesh,  has been quite
successfiul.  Loans through this program have experienced  a default rate of only three percent (Biggs et.
al., 1991). Braverman and Guasch (1989)  note, however, that other types of cooperative  credit programs
have been less successful.  They find these failed programs are characterized by  lack of joint
-29-responsibility  and sense of belonging  within the group, dishonesty,  and poor administration  and
coordination  both within  the group and with the lending  institution. These failures  underscore  the
importance  of carefully  designing  the structure  and incentives  within  a cooperative  credit  group.
-30-V.  PQlicy  lmplications
This paper has identified  effects  of taxes and asymmetric  information  on financing  choices. The
classical  corporate tax system is likely to create a lower opportunity  cost on the use of retained earnings
by the firm than new share issues. Asymmetric  information  may also create a financing  hierarchy within
the firm by which retained earnings  are available at a lower cost to the firm than external  financing. The
previous sections discussed several ways in which the cost of obtaining debt finance could exceed the
required return on additional  internal  financing.
These factors suggest that where firms do not all have equal access to  retained earnings,
investment  is unlikely to be undertaken in a manner which maximizes  the return to the economy from
its level of savings.
The important question  facing policy makers is whether there are instruments available to the
government  that are not available to the financial markets which could reduce the costs of asymmetric
information. This section  of the paper will examine  possible government  policies which could mitigate
the effects of asymmetric  information  on investment. The policies to be examined  can be grouped into
(a) policies which promote equities markets, (b) regulation of the banking sector, (c) specific tax
instruments, and (d) other measures.
A.  Promotion  of Equity Markets
Equity financing of investment  represents one alternative  to debt finance.  In the absence of
taxation  and asymmetric  information,  risk neutral agents  would  be indifferent  to these sources of finance.
A classical  corporate  tax system, by allowing  a deduction  for interest paid but not for dividends, creates
one wedge favoring debt finance.  We wish to  examine here whether, in the absence of this tax
disadvantage,  private markets would favor the use of equity financing  of investment  over debt. That is,
are the costs of asymmetric  information  less with equity finance than with debt finance?
Problems of asymmetric information are different, but still exist with equity finance.  The
-31-inability  of outside  equity owners to monitor perfectly  the effort of the firm's owner-manager  may result
in too little effort being provided by the manager (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  In activities where
managerial effort is an important determinant  to the success of the firm and not easily monitored, the
costs of asymmetric  information  with equity contracts  may be large.
Myers and Majluf (1984) note other costs that arise with equity finance when additional  funds
are required. Managers  of the firm have better information  on the value of the firm's existing  assets and
growth opportunities  than outsiders. If managers  seek to maximize the wealth of existing shareholders,
they will prefer to issue new equity when the firm is overvalued. Outsiders, knowing  this, discount the
amount they are willing to pay for the shares.  Truly good projects then must pay a premium to new
investors because they cannot be distinguished  from shares being issued by overvalued firms.
In both the Jensen and Meclding and Myers and Majluf models, if a firm could borrow with
riskless debt the problem of asymmetric  information  would  be overcome. In both cases a firm would use
debt finance to undertake all projects with positive net present value. Whether the costs of issuing  risky
debt are less than the costs of issuing new equity is unclear.  Myers (1984) suggests that a firm can
minimize the riskiness of its debt by keeping debt burdens low.  This allows the firm an option to issue
debt at low costs if it is in need  of financing  a very profitable  project.  A firm will forsake some positive
net present value projects in order to leave this funding option open.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) see a
tradeoff between issuing risky debt and equity depending  on the degree that the returns of the firm are
dependent  on managerial  effort and the scope the firm has to undertake projects with different degrees
of risk.  Where the former is dominant, debt is the optimal instrument. Where the latter is dominant,
equity is the optimal instrument. In between, mixtures  of debt and equity may minimize the costs of
asymmetric  information.
There is probably a role for both debt and equity securities.  It is unlikely that government
encouragement  of an equities market could increase costs of information  asymmetries. Parties could
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information,  are high.  de Meza and Webb (1987) point out that the inefficiencies  of debt finance found
in the model of Stiglitz  and Weiss (1981) which does not incorporate  moral hazard, would not exist with
an equity contract. Certainly, government  regulations  should not restrict the range of contingencies  over
which parties contract.
A well-functioning  equities market may initially require substantial investment  in providing an
institutional  infrastructure. An efficient  legal system to enforce contracts and to prosecute fraud is one
such investment. Uniform accounting  standards are necessary  to value securities  in an unbiased  manner.
Even in markets  with highly developed financial  and legal institutions,  price volatility and outright fraud
may exist.
Hybrid securities, or mixtures of debt and equity contracts may also serve to reduce costs of
asymmetric  information. Tax rules may hinder the development  of equity-like  securities. For example,
debt instruments with payment streams contingent  on the level of earnings may be treated as equity,
causing the firm to lose its deduction for these payments.
While equity  securities  have some incentive  advantages,  there are other reasons for believing  that
financial institutions such as banks may be  more successful at resolving problems of  information
asymmetries  than decentralized  securities  markets. Mishkin  (1990)  and others have noted the advantages
available to banks as lending institutions: information  collection costs may decline with the scale of
lending; a single lender is not subject to the free-rider problem of discovering the credit worthiness  of
a borrower that may be present in decentralized  securities markets; and costs of monitoring are not
duplicated.
Additionally, as noted by Stiglitz and Weiss (1983), banks are free to engage in multi-period
contracts with a borrower.  A multi-period contract making the issuance of further loans subject to
satisfactory  payment of earlier loans gives the lender more degr,hes  of freedom in structuring incentives
-33-for the borrower. One criticism  of the variety of models  presented in section  III is their focus on a single
investment,  whereas  "financial relations are not a one-shot affair" (Hellwig,  1989).  While multi-period
contracts  may improve  borrower/lender  contracts  relative to open securities  markets, the long-term  credit
reputation of a firm is a form of intangible capital which can enhance a firm's  ability to borrow at
reduced cost in open securities markets as well.
Alternative means of reducing informational asymmetries  include conglomerate mergers and
industrial groups like the Japanese  keiretsu.  Industrial groups have been recognized  as alternatives to
traditional  financial  institutions  (e.g., Leff 1976). Recent  research  on the Japanese  ke.retsu  has confirmed
their ability to reduce the effects of credit rationing (Hoshi, et. al. 1990a, 1990b). It should be noted,
however, that where only some firms have access  to group financing,  the overall allocation  of capital  may
not necessarily  be improved. Firms within  industrial  groups  may undertake  investment  with low marginal
returns, while firms outside industrial  groups are unable to undertake projects with higher returns.
B.  Regulation  of the Banking  Sector
The banking sector is frequently subject to a variety of regulations.  As mentioned above,
regulations restricting  the contingencies  over which borrowers and lenders may contract can limit the
ability of lenders to modify  the incentives  of borrowers. One example  of such a restriction  is an inability
for banks to take an equity position  in their borrowers.
Other specific changes  in regulations  may be highly dependent  on the form of the informational
asymmetry. For example, in section III it was shown that there can be over-investment  with competitive
lending  markets. Perhaps surprisingly,  regulations  limiting  competitiveness  of the banking  sector  can lead
to more efficient allocation  of investment  funds.  For example, a monopolist  lender would never reduce
lending rates to the point where the return on the marginal  borrower was negative. Lending rate floors
as opposed  to usury laws could increase efficiency  here by limiting borrowing. The quantity  of loanable
funds could also be limited through ceilings  on the rates which could be paid by banks.
-34-Where the informational  asymmetry causes under-investment,  policies restricting competition
would only further reduce investment. Deposit insurance, which can encourage risk-taking by banks,
may result in excessive  risk-taking  as demonstrated  in the U.S. in the 1980s. In the model  presented in
section IIM  leading to credit rationing, deposit  insurance would not improve the allocation  of investment
funds.
Competition  may also limit the ability  of a bank to engage  in certain multi-period  contracts. For
example, part of a bank's ability to enforce repayment  of debt may be the sanction of denying future
credit. Alternatively,  in return for favorable  treatment  toward a borrower in the present p-.riod,  the bank
may increase  the borrower's costs for subsequent  loans. In a competitive  loan market, the borrower may
be able to avoid these costs or the sanction  of credit denial by borrowing from a competing  bank for the
subsequent  loan (Mayer 1988).
C.  Tax Instruments
Section II of this paper identified  how the differing  tax treatment of equity and debt can create
divergent costs in the use of retained earnings, new share issues, and debt finance.  In this section, the
emphasis is on how specific tax instruments can improve the allocation of finance in the presence of
asymmetric  information.
Unfortunately, the use of tax instruments  appears to be highly dependent on the nature of the
information  asymmetry. In the model presented  in section  III where there is over-investment,  de Meza
and Webb (1987) show how a tax on interest paid on savings can lead to the first-best outcome. In a
similar model, Bernanke and Gertler (1990) find that a tax on the return to successful projects reduces
over-investment. Both papers note how t'uis  result is sensitive to the specification  of the information
asymmetry. In the model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)  leading  to rationing, de Meza and Webb  show that
an interest  rate subsidy  on savings  is necessary  to achieve  optimality. Cho (1986) suggests  that a tax paid
on successful projects to compensate  banks for losses incurred by banks on additional  loans beyond a
-35-rationing equilibrium may increase efficiency.
There may be systematic  characteristics  of the information  asymmetries  associated with certain
projects as opposed to certain entrepreneurs. In this case it may be easier to identify  types of projects
which sLu.uld  receive favored tax-treatment, rather than types of entrepreneurs.  For exaniple, Myers
(1977) and Long and Malitz (1985) suggest that firms with significant intangible  investments, such as
R&D, may be less likely to support debt finance  than firms with tangible  assets.  This is a result of the
Myers  model, where growth  opportunities  are less likely  to be undertaken  in the presence  of debt finance.
Debt finance can only be obtained in this model if lenders can anticipate  the extent of the future under-
investment. Because future intangible  investments  are more discretionary  and less easily monitored by
lenders than maintenance  of tangible assets, firms with intangible  investments  may be unable to obtain
debt finance.  Long and Malitz also note how the moral hazard problem of debt finance is greater with
intangible  investments. Firms have a greater ability  to shift the direction  of intangible  investment  toward
riskier projects than tangible investments,  the use of which is more easily monitored. This may argue
for more favorable  tax treatment of intangible  investments. Favorable  tax treatment  of R&D is frequently
argued on the grounds that the social returns to this activity  exceed the private returns. The information
asymmetry  argument suggests  there may be under-investment  in this activity even in the absence  of any
divergence  between social and private returns.
A number of other tax instruments, such as special tax rates for capital gains could also be
considered.  In some cases, it may be desirable to tax investment  gains and losses of lenders on an
accrual  basis rather than  upon realization. For example,  where a bank suffers losses  on its loan portfolio,
it may have an incentive  to sell this portfolio to realize the tax losses.  (Accounting  rules may on the
other hand give banks an incentive not to realize the loss.)  If there are certain efficiencies from a
continuing  borrower/lender relationship,  however, it would be more efficient  for the bank to be able to
receive the tax loss without requiring sale of the loan portfolio.  Such a system is designated mark-to-
-36-market, since the tax value of the securities are their current market value. The cost to the government
of this favorable treatment of tax losses could  be compensated  for by marking-to-market  all loans of the
bank, not just those that have declined in value.  The difficulty in such a proposal is that except for
widely traded securities market valuation  is difficult  to ascertain.
One role government  can  play in the presence  of a poorly functioning  equity  market is to become
an equity partner.  One way in which it can do this is to allow the immediate  write-off  or expensing  of
new investment.  This reduces the cost of an investment  I to (1  r)I, where r is the tax rate of the
entrepreneur. Where wealth  of the entrepreneur  is a limiting  factor, this can increase investment. Where
equity is an inefficient instrument, for example  because the effort of the entrepreneur  is variable, this
inefficiency  will also be present with the government  as an equity partner.  Additionally,  the ability of
the government  to perform as a pure equity  partner may be limited by imperfect  loss offsets, minimum
tax schedules, and progressive taxes.
D.  Other Measures
Bernanke and Gertler (1990) note the important effects of entrepreneurs' endowments  on the
efficiency  of investment. They suggest  that wealth redistribution  by the government  from entrepreneurs
with low-expected return projects to  entrepreneurs with high-expected  return projects can improve
efficiency. The effects of marginal changes  in wealth on projects with different  probabilities  of success
was examined  in section II.  Such policies would likely conflict with notions of horizontal and vertical
equity. Bernanke  and Gertler suggest  such wealth  transfers may talce  the form of debtor  bailouts, if such
entrepreneurs are believed to have good expected returns on investments.  They note, however, the
probable moral hazard problems of entrepreneurs  taking even riskier projects if they know they will be
bailed out in the event of failure.
It is not clear whether the government is better able to identify credit worthy recipients than
financial markets.  Tybout (1983) notes the failure of government credit schemes to allocate scarce
-37-financing  to its most efficient use.  Tybout finds the marginal  return on projects by firms rationed from
credit to have a higher return than firms favored under government  credit schemes. Tybout notes that
rent-seeking  activities  to receive  favored  government  treatment  can further  decrease efficiency. It should
be noted that government  provision  of credit is not limited  to countries  without  well-functioning  financial
institutions. One-third  of all credit extended  in the U.S. in the 1980s  has been subsidized  by the federal
government (Gale, 1991).
Stiglitz (1990) notes direct government intervention  in credit markets may be unlikely to be
successful:
If informational problems are the barrier to the development  of an effective capital
market, then there is no reason to presume that govermnental  lending agencies will be
in a superior position to address these problems.  Indeed, the lack of incentives for
government  bureaucrats to monitor loans may exacerbate  the problem.  13
Further, the political system may lack the willpower  to enforce the collection of goverment
debts, turning government  loans effectively  into government  grants.
Instead, Stiglitz  suggests  that more basic  government  efforts in establishment  of an infrastructure  -
- both physical and legal - may do more toward reducing credit risks.  Physical improvement of
transportation  networks and irrigation can directly reduce the risks faced by agrarian economies. The
establishment  of a legal infrastructure  would provide the legal means to einforce  credit contracts.
Policies which increased  the accessibility  of collateral  to borrowers  may also be warranted. For
example, land titling in rural areas might allow the use of land as collateral. This type of policy could
reduce information  costs of borrowing without the consequent  distributional  effects of policies such as
those suggested by Bernanke and Gertler.  In this regard, policies which lead to the accumulation  of
wealth also lower costs of asymmetric information. Further, lending institutions  which also serve as
13Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets,'  The World Bank EconoMic  Review
vol. 4 no. 3 (September 1990), p. 362.
-38  -savings institutions may be able to develop better information  regarding the credit worthiness of their
borrowers through this linkage and better enforce repayment  of loans.
Lenders that also have trading relationships  with their borrowers may have a greater ability to
minimize costs of asymmetric information. Policies that promote the dissemination  of credit through
trade networks may be effective.  Multinational  corporations  could be given incentives  to make credit
accessible  to customers  and suppliers. Efforts should  encourage  the transmission  of credit from each level
in these trade networks.
In the past many aspects  of credit programs in developing  countries  have been criticized  as being
overly rigid and not taking local conditions  into consideration. For example,  Kilby et. al. (1984, p. 279)
state: 'Constraints placed on the use of rural credit should  be removed  so that rural households  can more
easily allocate  their financial  resources  toward uses where  they perceive  the highest  return."  In a similar
vein, Thrup  (1990) criticizes the mandated use of certain technical factors, such as  fertilizers or
pesticides. It is true that these restrictions are likely to result in suboptimal  use of resources. But these
authors frequently fail to point out that these restrictions are in part necessitated  because the borrowers
and lenders  do not share equally in risk and returns. The structure  of the debt contract  is likely to induce
riskier projects than would  otherwise  be undertaken. Some  restrictions  on activities  may be the only way
that lenders can mitigate this tendency. Before criticizing  credit programs as overly restrictive  one must
determine  whether there are alternative  means to overcoming  the problems  of asymmetric  information.
Given  the variety of different  problems  caused  by asymmetric  information,  it would be surprising
if there were a sing'e solution  to these problems. Tradeoffs between alternative  policies abound.  The
optimal form of finance for some activities  may be debt while for others it is equity, depending  on the
importance of  effort by  the  entrepreneur and the  risks  of  alternative techniques of  production.
Restrictions  on the range of techniques  that may be used by a borrower reduce  the risk to the lender, but
may result in inappropriate  technology  being  used. Peer monitoring  groups offer one method of reducing
-39-monitoring  costs, but they may also transfer risk to borrowers who might be more risk-averse  than their
lenders. The composition  of peer monitoring  groups affects  risk diversification  and incentives  to monitor
other group members. The variety of tradeoffs suggests  that experimentation  with different approaches
to controlling  the costs of asymmetric  information  may be productive.
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Modigliani-Miller  (1963)  show how any stream of income from a levered firm can be achieved
from a similarly risky unlevered firm and borrowing by the stockholder  on his own personal account.
Because  the cash return from the two investments  is the same, the value of either position  must be equal.
This allows one to compare the value of the levered firm to the unlevered firm.
Consider a levered firm with assets yielding an uncertain  return,  debt B, and an interest rate r.
The amount of debt is assumed to be constant  over time.  An investor  who owns a share a of the firm
will have an after-tax cash flow of
(A-1)  CL = cO(x - rB)(1 - -rd(I - rd.
A shareholder  in an unlevered firm with the same uncertain  return would have an after-tax  cash
flow of
(A-2)  CU = o(x)(1  - rd)(1  - Te).
If the investor in the unlevered firm borrows an amount  equal to cvB(1  - rd)(1  - T)(1  - 7b), the
investor's net after-tax cash flow (after deducting  the interest  payments at rb) is identical  to CL.
Since the cash flows from both of these positions are identical, the dollar value of the positions
must be identical or there would be unlimited  arbitrage  profits to be made.  If aSu  is the dollar cost of
the shares in the unlevered firm, the investor's net capital invested is
(A-3)  tSU  - ciB(1  - rd)(l - 'rdl(I - Tb).
The investment  in the levered firm, aSL, must be equal to this amount, or
(A4)  SL = Su - B(1 - Tc)(l  - re)I(1  - Tb).
Finally, the total value of the levered firm VL is the sum of SL and B, while the value of the
unlevered  firm VU is SU.  Substituting  for SL and Su in equation (A-4) yields,
(A-5)  VL - Vu  = B[1 - (I - 7-d(l - Tdl(1 - -Tb].
This is the increase in the value of the firm from leveraging  when (1 - ib)  >  (1 - '  )( 1 - -).
-41-To give  an understanding  of the size of the potential  increase  in the value  of the firm  from debt
finance consider the following  parameters:  c  * 40. rb =  .40, and  Te  =  .10.  In this case, each unit
of capital  financed  through  debt  would  increase  the  market  value  of the levered  firm  by 10  percent  of the
value  of the capital  acquired  relative  to the unlevered  firm.
-42-Appendix  B.  Rationing  with  Asymmetric  Information
This model  assumes  that  all projects  have  the same  expected  return, but both  the probability  of
success  Pi and the return if successful  RS  vary.  In such a model,  the marginal  entrepreneur  who Is
indifferent  between  undertaking  his project and lending  at the safe interest  rate p has the highest
probability  of success  of those  projects  receiving  funding. As a result, increases  in the borrowing  rate
r will  cause  the best  credit  risks  to drop  out. Bank  profits  may  be higher  by rationing  credit  rather  than
by increasing  the rate  at which  they  lend  funds. The result  that  the marginal  entrepreneur  has the  highest
probability  of success  of those  projects  undertaken  is presented  here.
The assumption  that  the expected  returns  from all projects  are identical,
(B-1)  piR$l  +  (1-pi)Rf = constant,
implies  that MRS/Opi  <  0.
An entrepreneur  will choose  to undertake  his or her project  if the expected  profits  exceed  the
return  that could  be earned  by lending  one's wealth  at the safe interest  rate p,
(B-2)  pi(R$i  - (I+r)B)  2  (1 + p)w.
Note that since  (1  +r)B >  Rf, and  since  equation  (B-1)  is unaffected  by changes  in pi, the left-
hand side  of equation  (B-2)  must  be decreasing  in Pi. Thus, the entrepreneur  for whom  equation  (B-2)
holds  as an equality  has the highest  probability  of success  of those  projects  undertaken.
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